Response to Philip Scranton’s Report On Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution

“At stake” were the lives of workers and consumers who were exposed to what the industry worried was a human carcinogen. At the very least, government regulators had the right to know what workers, consumers and the broad public might be facing. Professor Scranton does not acknowledge what is clear from the documents: that industry representatives in the early 1970s understood that this information should be shared with the government, even if they chose not to do so.

“Producers acted rapidly,” he argues, “to explore the possible validity of ‘information’ so as to determine whether it could become scientific knowledge, the latter being solid enough to share with all parties – workers, government and the public at large” (Scranton, p.4). He says this as a way of explaining away the fact that the industry did not share with governmental regulators crucial information necessary to the regulatory efforts.

Scranton, (pps 16– 23) seeks to speak about areas where he is unprepared, first arguing that secrecy was essential for good science, then that openness was essential for good science. He also conflates telling regulators about troubling research findings about animals exposed to low levels of vinyl chloride monomer dying from a very rare cancer with publication of preliminary results in peer reviewed medical journals. As in the above example, Scranton misleads his reader by raising red herrings, distracting the reader from industry’s failure to inform government of troubling data.

In his discussion of the methodology of science Scranton exhibits a naïve and mistaken understanding of both the contemporary debates about the scientific method as well as of the responsibilities and obligations of the scientist. For example, to explain the fact that the chemical industry, despite its knowledge of the possible carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride, decided not to tell the government, Scranton argues about the “proper” scientific methods and obligations. Rather than observe that this decision not to tell the government was, at the very least, an ethical lapse, he seeks to explain it away by arguing that without “reliable knowledge” (Scranton, p.16) that vinyl chloride monomer was carcinogenic in animals at low doses, the industry was following “sound scientific practice” by keeping silent about its data and its suspicions (Scranton, p.18). He argues, “reports of preliminary data or initial findings have no scientific value [our emphasis] until they generate broader theories about the phenomena at hand, theories that incorporate and explain the details first-phase research has generated” (Scranton, pp.16-17). Despite the fact that there was near-universal anxiety among industry representatives that vinyl chloride monomer was the cause of angiosarcoma deaths in test animals, Scranton argues that, even if this were the case, the industry was obliged to keep silent about its suspicions!

Previous Page | Page 20 | Next Page