Scranton is playing fast and loose with the Markowitz deposition where, on page 515 (not p. 505 as he believes) Dr. Markowitz says he has not seen a report which has incorporated restrictive phrasing that the MCA demanded from the University of Michigan. Here, Scranton conflates two “final reports:” The University of Michigan final report that was, in essence rejected by the MCA and a final report that incorporated the changes which has never been made public, if it was ever issued. It is a misrepresentation of Markowitz’ testimony to claim that Markowitz “acknowledged that he had never read the Final Report from the University of Michigan study”(Scranton, p.7). A reading of the testimony makes it clear that the report Markowitz is referring to was either not reissued with the adjusted language or never released by the industry.
Scranton chides us for not providing “an adequate narration for the year mid-1972 to mid-1973” (p.8). We leave it to readers to look at the chapters and judge for themselves whether or not our discussion is inadequate. Scranton suggests an “adequate narration” would be one that interprets the industry’s actions, and specifically its refusal to share Maltoni’s findings with NIOSH as “good science,” not self-interest. For example, Scranton (page 8) writes: “An adequate narration of the year from mid-1972 to mid-1973 would have shown some of the U.S. VCM/PVC producers agreeing to nondisclosure in order to gain access to otherwise unavailable European preliminary data, [his emphasis] so as to assist with planning their own toxicological studies (which were thereby reoriented).” This assertion ignores the fact that the Secrecy Agreement was maintained after it was revealed to the American manufacturers that vinyl chloride monomer was responsible for cancers at very low doses. The industry itself carried on its own internal discussions of the immorality, if not the illegality, of maintaining secrecy in the face of government requests of information and decided to maintain secrecy. The fact is that the MCA planned to NOT let NIOSH know of the angiosarcomas associated with VCM - that is, to maintain secrecy despite misgivings of its own about doing so and their awareness of the implications of such secrecy. We note that the decision to NOT tell the whole truth worried some members of the industry: some wondered whether this was evidence of an illegal conspiracy and others questioned the morality of this decision. For our historical purposes we believe that our two chapters on the span of time from the early 1960s through the 1980s were adequate. None of the further research Scranton asks for would change the history we present. The refrain of industry at the time and since when confronted with threatening information or demand for regulatory action has been that the issue “needs more research.” One need only to pay attention to the modern debate over global warming to see how this tactic is used to deflect action and reform.
Scranton also faults us for not following up on Umberto Saffioti’s presence at Dr. Maltoni’s presentation at the 2nd International Symposium on Cancer Detection and Prevention in April, 1973. (Scranton p.9) He argues that we did not follow up on “several key issues.” 1) although we have the pre-print of Maltoni’s research findings which were not published until 1974 after the revelations regarding workers dying from vinyl chloride exposure. But, it does not deal with the issue of what Maltoni actually presented at the conference. 2) at the Tunney Senate Hearings that Scranton references, Saffiotti makes clear that he did not recall that Maltoni mentioned any of the specifics of his research, particularly absent was a remembrance of any mention of angiosarcoma of the liver with regard to vinyl chloride. We assume that Professor Scranton is adopting an industry argument that seeks to shift the focus of discussion away from industry’s actions and to governmental inaction. This tactic was used in 1974, when the industry argued it had told the government of Maltoni’s findings. The reader of our book will know that government officials were outraged by this attempt to shift responsibility and blame. Scranton is just wrong when he says that Saffiotti had discussed Maltoni’s “research with him personally in April, 1973” (Scranton, p.10).
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